A person can survive in two copies of themselves, philosopher Max More argues
A person can survive in two copies of themselves, philosopher Max More argues
In a conversation on November 20, gerontologist Aubrey de Grey, More, and entrepreneur Kai Micah Mills discuss whether someone would remain the same person after their preserved brain was restored. De Grey doubts that two successors could both be the same person; Mills insists on restoring the original.
De Grey sees extending healthspan, the time spent in good health, as a practical route to further life extension: the extra years offer a chance to live long enough for the next treatment. Mills objects that limiting research to extending healthy life would exclude cryonics, the preservation of a body or brain at low temperatures for possible future restoration. Cryonics is intended to give people whom today's medicine cannot help a chance of treatment in the future.
The prospect of future brain repair prompted de Grey to join the discussion. In a July essay on brain preservation that More mentions in the conversation, the authors considered both repairing the original tissue and scanning the brain to recreate the person. If repair requires replacing damaged parts in their original locations, how would that differ from recreating the brain from its preserved structure?
More devoted his 1995 dissertation to the persistence of personal identity through change. For him, survival depends on whether memories, intentions, values, and personality traits persist. We change every day and forget some of our past; More considers these changes compatible with survival. In his thought experiment, one person becomes two, each with the same brain structure and memories. They then lead separate lives, each continuing the original person's life story. They are two distinct people, and in More's view, the original person lives on in both.
De Grey objects: how can each of the two be the very same person as their shared predecessor? His intuition is that a person can have only one successor. If the restoration could be repeated to produce another such person, de Grey doubts that the original person has survived. By the end of the conversation, he says of his understanding of personal identity: “Now I am even less certain than before.”
More and Mills share a research goal: to learn how to preserve the original brain and restore its function after storage. More himself prefers biological restoration, although he accepts in principle that a person could survive in a computer copy. Mills sees a possible role for a digital copy as an ally. If other people's digital copies became more powerful than biological humans, a copy with Mills's memories and habits could help him survive among them. Mills himself would continue living in his own body, with that copy as an assistant.